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Technical Trading, Predictability and 
Learning in Currency Markets 
 
 
This paper studies predictability of currency returns over time and the extent to which 
it is captured by trading rules commonly used in currency markets. We consider the 
strategies that an investor endowed with rational expectations could have pursued to 
exploit out-of-sample currency predictability and generate abnormal returns. We find 
a close relation between these strategies and indices that track popular technical 
trading rules, namely moving average cross-over rules and the carry trade, implying 
that the technical rules represent heuristics by which professional market participants 
exploit currency mispricing. We find evidence that such mispricing reflects initially 
wrong investors’ beliefs (wrong priors), but information is efficiently processed as it 
becomes available. Predictability is highest in the mid ’90, subsequently decreases 
sharply, but increases again in the final part of the sample period, especially for the 
Euro and other emerging currencies. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a literature that spans more than thirty years, various studies have reported that 
filter and moving average crossover rules, as well as other technical trading rules, 
including the carry trade, often result in statistically significant trading profits in 
currency markets. Beginning with Dooley and Shafer (1976, 1984) and continuing 
with Sweeney (1986), Levich and Thomas (1993), Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997), 
Chang and Osler (1999), LeBaron (1999), and Schulmeister (2006), among others, 
this evidence suggests that currencies are predictable to an extent that casts doubts on 
the efficient market hypothesis (henceforth, EMH). More recently, however, and 
contrary to the bulk of these earlier findings, a number of authors, including Olson 
(2004) and Pukthuanthong, Levich and Thomas (2007), find evidence of diminishing 
profitability of currency trading over time. In a comprehensive re-evaluation of past 
studies of filter and moving average (MA) rules, Neely, Weller and Ulrich (2009), 
also find evidence of declining profitability. Based on these recent studies, it is 
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tempting to conclude that currency markets have become more efficient. Such 
conclusion is, however, challenged by evidence that other strategies, such as trading 
rules that exploit the so called “forward premium puzzle”, including until recently the 
carry trade, continue to generate returns that appear to be large and relatively 
uncorrelated with known risk factors. See, among others, Burnside et al. (2007), 
Brunnermeir et al. (2008) and Jylha et al. (2010) as well as Neely, Weller and Ulrich 
(2009), who also note that less popular and relatively more sophisticated strategies 
continued to generate excess-profitability even as the profitability of the simpler and 
more popular ones declined. Ultimately, these studies provide alternative and to some 
extent conflicting views on the presence of mispricing in foreign exchange markets 
and on whether currency trading is an economically useful endeavour.  
 
In this paper, our aim is therefore twofold. On the one hand, we aim to shed light on 
whether currencies and currency markets have indeed become less predictable and 
more efficient, respectively. On the other hand, we seek to establish whether popular 
currency strategies can be seen as trading heuristics employed by imperfectly rational 
investors to exploit currency predictability in order to achieve rational or near-
rational trading outcomes, thereby eliminating over time currency mispricing. We 
base our inferences on out-sample predictability. To this end, we compare and 
contrast, on the one hand, stylized trading strategies that mimic popular currency 
trading rules and, on the other hand, strategies that aim to generate the maximal 
Sharpe ratio attainable by exploiting currency predictability. We refer to the former 
as “technical trading rules” and to the latter as “rational trading rules”. The technical 
rules are represented by the momentum strategy, tracked by the AFX Currency 
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Management index constructed by Lequeux and Acar (1998) by combining filter 
moving average rules1 on the major currencies, and the carry trade, captured by the 
HML Index of Lustig et al. (2011). The rational rules, instead, are based on a 
predictive model that is meant to mimic the model that would have been used, at the 
time of making the trading decision, by an investor endowed with rational 
expectations (RE), as defined by Muth (1961) and later further formalized by Sargent 
(1993). The study of in-sample predictability, which would also offer useful 
indications, is left for parallel research work. 
 
Our empirical results offer evidence of violations of the EMH at the beginning of the 
sample period, i.e. in the early 90s, and in its final part, in coincidence with the 
outbreak of the financial turbulence that characterized the period 2007-2010. This is 
not only the case of emerging currencies, such as the Russian Rouble, the Brazilian 
Real and the Polish Zloty, but also of the Euro. This suggests that the conclusion in 
favour of vanishing profitability of technical trading rules, which has gained support 
in recent years in the empirical literature, may be premature. More importantly, we 
find that our rational trading rules are to a large extent tracked, over different 
portions of the sample period, by the technical rules. This implies that technical 
trading, far from being an irrational and wasteful endeavour, is a way for currency 
portfolio managers to exploit, and hence eventually correct, mispricing relative to a 
RE benchmark. It should be noticed that, because we use monthly data, our results 
are robust to issues that crop up at higher-frequencies. For example, because of the 
                                                        
1
 Menkhoff et al. (2011) point out that moving average rules do not capture in full the profitability that 
can be generated by exploiting currency momentum but, as implicitly acknowledged by the same 
authors, they are indeed representative of the strategies that have been traditionally employed by 
currency managers and academics alike to do so.  
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low frequency of the strategies we consider, it is unlikely that non-proportional 
transaction costs arising as a result of ‘price pressure’, e.g. Evans and Lyons (2002), 
may play an important role. Overall, our evidence helps rationalize market 
participants’ enduring tendency to engage in technical analysis and other active 
currency management practices. As pointed out by Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), 
currency traders exhibit an obstinate obsession for technical analysis, more so than 
traders of other asset classes.  
 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline 
the relation between predictability and time-varying expected returns and illustrate 
the rational trading rules which play a key role in our analysis. In Section 3, we 
describe our dataset. In Section 4, 5 and 6, we present our empirical results on out-
sample predictability and market learning. In the final Section, we summarize our 
main findings and offer conclusions.  
 
2. Currency Predictability and Rational Trading Rules  
 
We interpret an exchange rate as the price of a particular security, i.e. a default-free 
interest-bearing deposit denominated in a foreign currency, with price and payoffs 
expressed in terms of units of the domestic currency, i.e. the US Dollar, which in our 
study acts as the numeraire. For ease of exposition, we will refer to such deposits as 
the currencies in which they are denominated, e.g. the Canadian Dollar will be a unit 
deposit denominated in such currency and funded in USD. We represent the data-
generating process (DGP) of currency excess-returns as follows: 
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 1 1t t tr µ ε+ += +         (1) 
 
Here 1( | )t t tE r Iµ +≡ , tI  is the information set at time t and 1+tε  is a conditionally 
zero-mean innovation, i.e. a (non-degenerate) random variable unpredictable with 
respect to the information set tI , i.e.  = 0, with finite but possibly time-
varying variance 2
,tεσ . Conditioning down, this implies	
 =  =
0 ∀  ∈ . In this setup, the EMH boils down to the requirement that the expected 
excess-return tµ  equals the discount rate demanded by the marginal investor to hold 
the asset, i.e. the currency. In the context of our tests of the weak-form EMH, tI  
includes the sigma-field generated by the past of 1tε + , which belongs to the 
information set   available to the econometrician and we thus have  = , but it 
may also include, in tests of the semi-strong and strong form EMH, other available 
public and private information, in which case we might have   ⊆ , but this does not 
need to concern us here as these forms of the EMH are outside the scope of the 
present paper. 
 
Our approach to testing the EMH in currency markets is based on the back-testing of 
trading rules that seek to mimic the strategies that would have been followed by an 
optimizing risk-averse currency trader endowed with RE. At any one time, the 
simulated rational trading rule invests in the ith currency an amount of wealth 
proportional to the expected excess-return and inversely to its conditional variance. 
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That is, the net amount of numeraire currency, i.e. the USD, invested in the ith 
currency at any one time t under the rule is2   
 
,
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,
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Here,
 
λ  is an arbitrary but constant coefficient of proportionality. This strategy 
combines a directional signal, i.e. the conditional mean 
,i tµ , with a volatility filter, 
i.e. 2
,i tσ . As shown by Cochrane (1999), it generates the maximal unconditional 
Sharpe ratio (SR) attainable by exploiting the predictability of 
, 1i tr + , i.e. in our 
context the excess-return on the ith currency. The strategy is very similar to the 
“dynamic strategies” of Ferson and Siegel (2001). The only difference is that, in 
Ferson and Siegel (2001, 2009), the ‘weights’ are also a function of the unconditional 
SR and unconditional mean. For the one risky-asset case, the position taken in the i-
th currency at time t according to the Ferson and Siegel (2001, 2009) dynamic 
strategy is   
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Here, 
 
                                                        
2
 In-sample versions of these rules have been already used by Levich and Potì (2008). 
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and * *
,
( )i tSR SR r=  is the maximal SR attainable by exploiting the predictability of the 
ith currency and therefore the unconditional SR of the corresponding rational trading 
rule. Whether we use the weights in (2) or in (3), the time t + 1 excess-return on the 
resulting strategy is  
 
*
, 1 , , 1i t i t i tr w r+ +=
   (4) 
 
To gain power against the market efficiency null, we also consider ‘average’ 
strategies consisting of investing in the rational trading rule for each currency i a 
fraction iω  of one’s portfolio. Denoting by n the number of currencies in which such 
strategy invests at time t, it will have return 
 
*
, 1 , , 1
1
n
avg t i i t i t
i
r w rω+ +
=
= ∑    (5) 
 
To test the restriction  = 0 ∀  ∈ , we (a) use maximum likelihood (ML) 
to estimate a reduced-form representation of the DGP in (1), (b) use these estimate to 
form forecasts of (excess-)retuns and their volatility, (c) use these forecasts in a 
simulated rational trading rule defined by either (2) or (3) and, lastly, (d) test whether 
the strategy offers abnormal return by testing for ‘alphas’ relative to a kernel 1+tm that 
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prices the traded assets. We adopt the usual linear functional specification for the 
kernel, i.e. 
 
 1 1 'tm f b+ = +         (6) 
 
Here, f is a vector of factors and b is a conformable vector of parameters, with 
elements that represent the negative of the associated factor risk prices. In (6), the 
mean of the kernel is 1 ( ) 'E f b+ . This is legitimate because, when pricing excess 
returns, the mean of the kernel is essentially not identified and therefore can be set 
arbitrarily.  
 
Our reliance on trading rules based on ML estimates of the DGP overcomes, at least 
to some extent, a number of crucial shortcomings of prior tests of the weak-form 
EMH. Our approach, in fact, does not require that the econometrician be able to 
identify all trading strategies that rational investors could have possibly devised to 
exploit episodes of currency mispricing (ML will do this for the econometrician, as 
long as the model parameterization encompasses the DGP). This is instead an 
implicit assumption of studies that attempt to make inferences on market efficiency 
by testing for abnormal profitability of select technical trading rules. Because the 
econometrician necessarily works with only a subset of available information and is 
arguably not endowed with as much rationality as experienced traders (as suggested 
by the say “if you are so smart why aren’t you rich”), and hence can identify at best 
only a subset of possible trading strategies, findings in support of efficiency based on 
this methodology may be suspect. On this, see also Griffin et al. (2010).  
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The usual remedy to this ill may be worse than the cure, as to gain power researchers 
typically engage in a search over a wide range of strategies. There are two problems 
with this approach, as noted in the seminal work of White (2000). First, by searching 
long enough for a profitable rule, the analyst will sooner or later find one that, in a 
simulated out-of-sample exercise, turns out to be profitable (“luck”). Second, with 
the benefit of hindsight, the strategies in the search set may be known to have been 
successful over the study period. Hence, inferences about genuine excess-
profitability might be misguided. Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012), applying the False 
Discovery Rate (FDR) technique to the analysis of the out-of-sample performance of 
equity technical trading rules, show that this is indeed the case. Our approach is 
immune to such problems because, in using ML estimates of the DGP to generate our 
out-of-sample forecasts, we simply impose the RE null with respect to the sigma 
field generated by the past of the currency return process. That is, we are simply 
replicating what a rational analyst, who has attended an undergraduate time series 
econometric course, would do to identify and exploit predictability, if asked by the 
currency manager (his boss) to do so. This analyst may be straight out of college and 
not only have no access to private information but also (very realistically!) he may 
not know too well sophisticated models of exchange rates. Our approach, in fact, 
does not even require that the econometrician be able to identify and accurately 
measure economic fundamentals. Given the profession’s imperfect understanding of 
the exchange rate determination mechanism, this is another important advantage of 
our approach. Since our out-of-sample tests are based on forecasts that exploit only 
information contained in past prices (i.e. currency returns), however, they can only be 
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used to make inferences on the EMH in its weak form. Also, echoing remarks made 
by Griffin et al (2010), they can detect mispricing only to the extent that exchange 
rates do eventually revert to their RE fundamental valuation, and that they do so not 
too slowly before the end of the sample period. 
 
3.  Data 
 
Our dataset includes prices in US Dollars (USD) of the most liquid front-month 
currency futures contracts over the period 1988-2010 traded at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME). These include the futures on the Australian and 
Canadian Dollar, the Japanese Yen, the British Pound, the Swiss Franc, the Deutsche 
Mark/Euro (we combine data on the Deutsche Mark futures before the introduction 
of the Euro in 1999 and on the latter after its launch), the Norwegian Krone, the 
Brazilian Real, the Polish Zloty, the South African Rand, the Russian Ruble and the 
Turkish Lira. The futures prices are ‘chained’ to ensure comparability over time. 
Also, to gain power against the EMH and extend the sample period, we broaden the 
set of test asset payoffs by including currency portfolios considered by Lustig et al 
(2008, 2011), constructed by sorting stocks according to the level of their interest 
rates, and rebalanced yearly. These are the same portfolios used by Lustig et al 
(2008, 2011) to construct HMLFX. The advantage of using portfolios of currencies 
rather than the individual currencies is reduced sampling error, much in the same way 
as when equity pricing models are tested on portfolios of stocks sorted along various 
dimensions, rather than on individual stocks. In (6), remaining consistent with the 
perspective of the American marginal investor, we use the time series of excess-
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returns on the market, size and book-to market portfolios3 of US stocks that mimic 
the Fama and French (1993) factors.  
 
4.  Performance of Predictability-Based Strategies 
 
We first construct ‘baseline’ rational trading rules (excess-)returns using (2) in (4) 
and (5). The inputs are monthly out-of-sample forecasts of excess-returns and 
volatility generated using 5-year rolling windows of currency data. As a reduced 
form representation of the excess-return DGP, we employ the following ARMA(p,q) 
augmented by a GARCH(1,1) variance equation: 
 
rt = const. + b1rt-1 + ..... + bprt-p + c1ut-1 + ..... + cqut-q + ut (7) 
 
This choice is motivated by the fact that any stationary process can be represented as 
an ARMA(p,q) for a suitable choice of p and q. Relatively parsimonious ARIMA 
models of exchange rates, and thus ARMA models of currency returns, have been 
shown to capture substantial predictability, e.g. Taylor (1994). Of course, we could 
have used more flexible and complex specifications to gain power against the null of 
no (excess-)predictability, but we would have left the door open to the danger of data 
snooping. For comparison, however, we also use exponential smoothers that can be 
seen as versions of the Kalman filter and therefore generalized versions of (7). To 
keep our computational task manageable, however, we use in this case a constant 
variance specification, treating the volatility input in (2) as an (arbitrary) constant. It 
                                                        
3
 This data was downloaded from the website of Kenneth French, whose kindness we gratefully 
acknowledge. 
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is very likely that our estimates of expected excess-returns contain a bias. Therefore, 
when working with currency futures for which price data is available, we focus on 
the information captured by the change in their forecast price and use 


, 1
,
1 ,
( )
ˆ 1
( )
t i t
i t
t i t
E S
E S
µ +
−
= −  as our estimator of the expected currency futures excess return, 
where 
, 1( )t i tE S +  denotes the one-step ahead forecast of the currency futures price 
according to the estimated DGP reduced form representation. In this case, to generate 
one-step forecasts of currency futures prices 
, 1i tS + , we use an ARIMA(p,q) model 
with conditionally heteroskedastic errors, corresponding to the GARCH(1,1)-
augmented ARMA(p,q) of excess-returns in (7). When working with the interest rate-
sorted currency portfolios of Lustig et al. (2011), this approach is unpractical and, to 
generate one-step ahead monthly forecasts of excess-returns and their volatility, we 
use instead directly the ARMA(p,q) of excess-returns (i.e., rate of returns adjusted for 
the net cost of carry) in (7) augmented by the GARCH(1,1) specification for the 
variance process. To distinguish the rational rules based on currency futures data 
from those based on the six interest rate-sorted portfolios constructed by Lustig et al 
(2008, 2011), we denote the (excess-)return on former as ,∗  and the excess-return on 
the latter as ,,∗ . In all cases, the predictive model that provides the reduced-
form representation of the DGP is estimated over 5-year rolling windows of monthly 
currency data. 
 
To estimate the predictive models we use Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML). This 
method is asymptotically equivalent to Maximum Likelihood (ML) in the presence of 
possibly non-normally distributed errors, assuming stationarity and ergodicity of the 
14 
 
DGP. In large samples, it is thus consistent with the implications of the RE null under 
relatively mild distributional assumptions. We use the ‘small sample’ version of the 
AIC as the model selection criterion4, i.e. AICsmall = AIC + 2k (k + 1)/(l – k – 1), 
where k = p + q. This version of the AIC was formulated by Sugiura (1978) and later 
used by Hurvich and Tsai (1989). Just like the AIC, it adjusts the sample estimator of 
twice the expected log-likelihood for its bias but, in doing so, it uses an expansion of 
the bias of higher order than the one used by the AIC. It should be noticed that, in our 
context, the search for the model with the optimal AIC does not imply a composite 
hypothesis and hence does not require an analysis a la White (2000) or along the 
lines of Bajgrowicz and Scailet (2012). In fact, our AIC-based search is simply a 
consequence of imposing the EMH/RE null, which prescribes the maximization of 
the expected (log-)likelihood. In carrying out our tests, we simply focus our attention 
on the model that is picked by the AIC as the one with the largest (unbiased estimate 
of the) expected log-likelihood and thus the most likely reduced form representation 
of the DGP. In using the AIC as the model selection criterion, we allow for AR and 
MA terms p and q of up to the fifth order. 
 
The unrestricted baseline rational trading rule may exhibit substantial variation in the 
allocation to each currency over time, entailing possibly substantial risk-taking. This 
is not in principle a concern in tests of the EMH. In fact, in such tests, it is the 
                                                        
4
 Unlike the Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is not consistent 
(just like other popular criterions, such as the R2), in the sense of selecting the ‘true’ forecasting model with 
the ‘correct’ list of regressors as the sample size increases without bounds. As also noted by Pesaran and 
Timmermann (1995), however, the consistency property is not as important as it may appear at first when 
the ‘correct’ list of regressors is unknown and may be changing over time,	 as it is typically the case when 
seeking to forecast asset returns. In such a context, as suggested by these authors, the ability to ex-post 
select an explanatory equation “that could be viewed at the time as being a reasonable approximation to the 
DGP” is of greater importance. The AIC, although statistically inconsistent, displays such ability, in that it 
has the property of yielding an approximate model and, as shown by Shibata (1976), strikes a good balance 
between giving biased estimates when the order of the model is too low and the risk of increasing the 
variance when too many regressors are included. 
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marginal positions that matter since optimizing investors are supposed to invest only 
a marginal fraction of their wealth in each asset, in order to maximize diversification 
benefits. Hence, since a marginal position is by definition infinitesimal, it does not 
matter whether in the course of trading it needs to be incremented by any finite 
though possibly very large factor. Nonetheless, to appreciate the effect of leverage on 
the performance of the rational trading rules, we consider also the performance of 
‘restricted’ rational trading rules, constructed under given restrictions on leverage. 
We construct the strategies placing the restriction at different levels of leverage. 
These include no leverage, denoted by lev = 0, and leverage equal to k times the 
allocated risk capital, denoted by lev = k, where k is chosen so as to limit risk 
exposure in line with typical risk-taking limits and stop-losses faced by traders. 
Under these restriction, we have that 
,i tw k≤  ∀ i and t. 
 
Baseline rational trading rules 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the currency futures ‘baseline’ rational 
trading rules, i.e. those obtained for each currency futures based on (2) and (4), for 
their ‘equally weighted’ average strategy, with return as in (5) with 112iω =  ∀ i, 
where i refers to the i-th currency, for the technical trading rules, and for the Fama 
and French factors. One noticeable fact is that, with some exceptions, the SRs of the 
individual currencies rational trading rules are not particularly high. For example, the 
SR of the average rational trading rule is 8 percent per month or 27 percent on an 
annualized basis. Nonetheless, due to the low loadings (not reported to save space) 
on the market and the other Fama and French factors, some of the strategies exhibit 
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statistically positive ‘alphas’. This is shown in Table 2 for the period 1997-2010, 
which is the longest one for which we have enough data to estimate the out-of-
sample forecasting models for all currencies (which require 5 years of data each). 
More importantly, the Table shows that predictability is more pronounced for 
emerging currencies. Interestingly, it also suggests that the Euro should be perhaps 
included among such emerging currencies, due to its high alpha. It is worth noticing 
that the performance of the strategies based on the ARMA(p,q)+GARCH(1,1) model 
is substantially better than those based on the exponential smoother, whereas the 
latter is comparable to the performance of the strategies based on ARMA(p,q) 
models with constant volatility (not reported to save space). This suggests that 
modelling heteroskedasticity is important in capturing predictability and therefore, 
from now on, we do not report results for the exponential smoother because we find 
it computationally unduly demanding to augment it with a model of time-varying 
conditional variance (we experienced substantial convergence and global 
identification problems).  
 
In Table 3, we report alphas and their associated t-tests, using both OLS and HAC 
Newy-West (1987) standard errors, for a broader set of technical trading rules, and 
both restricted and unrestricted average rational trading rules, which now also include 
average rules based on the interest rate-sorted currency portfolios of Lustig et al. 
(2011). In some cases, the leverage restriction considerably lowers the attainable 
alpha. That is, the strongest evidence of EMH violations comes from strategies that 
are difficult to implement in practice for the typical currency trader. Nonetheless, 
they imply excess-volatility of exchange rates relative to a RE benchmark and 
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therefore, while difficult to risk-arbitrage, they imply allocative inefficiency and a 
possible welfare loss that matters from a public policy perspective. Not surprisingly, 
due to a diversification effect, the performance of the average rational rules based on 
the interest-rate sorted currency portfolios is better than the one of the average 
rational rule that exploits the predictability of the individual currencies, but 
nevertheless they do not beat the technical trading rules. 
 
Table 4 and 5, using for performance attribution the CAPM and the Fama and French 
3-Factor model, respectively, offer a more detailed comparison of the strategies over 
time. The Tables focus on the excess-performance of average unrestricted rational 
rules that use different subsets of the currency futures, and compare them to the 
excess-performance of the technical rules. Interestingly, Table 4 shows that, with the 
exception of the final portion of the sample period, i.e. 2006-2010, excess-
predictability, as picked up by the rational rules, appears to be confined to emerging 
currencies and the Euro. The AFX momentum strategy and the carry trade alternate 
as sources of favourable abnormal performance over the periods 1996-2000 and 
2001-2005, with the latter taking over from the former in the later period. The 
rational rule picks up some marginally significant excess-predictability also in the 
initial part of the sample period, i.e. 1992-1995. This pattern can be seen in Figure 1, 
which plots the CAPM alphas for the average rational rules for the emerged and 
emerging currencies. There is a marked ‘slump’ of alphas in the central period, about 
2001-2007, essentially yet another manifestation of the phenomenon known as the 
“great moderation”, preceded by relatively high excess-predictability in the first half 
of the 90s (it should be kept in mind that the alphas are estimated over rolling 
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windows looking backwards 5 years) and followed by a spike after 2007.  As shown 
in Figure 2, however, the sudden rise of alpha of the emerged currencies rational rule 
is largely explained by the surge of the alpha of the Euro strategy, suggesting again 
that perhaps this currency should be treated as an emerging one, due to its relatively 
recent introduction or the market learning that (has) had to take place about the 
somewhat unusual institutional arrangements behind it. Table 5 offers similar 
indications though, in this case, abnormal performance is confined to the Carry 
Trade, in 2001-2005, and the average rational rule for the emerging currencies as 
well as the EUR, in the final 2006-2010 period. 
 
Optimal rational trading rules 
 
To gain power against the EMH, we now turn to considering the ‘optimal’ trading 
rules based on the Ferson and Siegel (2001, 2009) ‘weights’ in (3). The estimates of 
the conditional moments in (3) are given, as before in (2), by their out-of-sample 
forecasts. As for the unconditional moments, *
,
( )i tE r  is simply the target excess-
return expected from the strategy and can be chosen arbitrarily whereas *2SR  
requires careful modelling. In the out-of-sample context of our study, while we can 
assume knowledge of unconditional moments thanks to RE, we need to be careful in 
using their sample counterparts as their estimates. This, while consistent with the RE 
null under the assumption that the DGP is stationary and ergotic, would entail a 
testing strategy with an in-sample dimension.5 Nonetheless, we can usefully adapt the 
Ferson and Siegel (2001, 2009) approach. To do so, we take RE to its extreme 
                                                        
5
 There seem to be a strong prejudice in the profession against in-sample tests of predictability and 
therefore we are threading carefully so as to avoid any suspect that our out-of-sample tests might have 
suffered some in-sample ‘contamination’. 
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implications and assume that the investor knows the maximal SR attainable from 
exploiting predictability and the sample SR, ex post, turns out what the investor 
expected ex-ante. That is, we set *SR equal to the sample SR of the trading rule. The 
problem, in this approach, is that we can only compute the sample SR after we have 
constructed the weights and computed the strategy excess-returns, using (4). To solve 
the circularity, we therefore compute the SR and weights iteratively, starting from an 
initial guess for *2SR  equal to 4.42 percent (i.e., the variance of the kernel assuming 
a relative risk aversion of the marginal investor equal to 2.5 and a market volatility 
equal to about 20 percent per annum and approximating the volatility of the kernel as 
the product between relative risk aversion and market volatility). The ‘estimation’ 
converged to the desired weights and a monthly 
*2
SR equal to 2.38 percent after just 
three iterations.  
 
The upshot of using (3) instead of (2) is that extreme weights are ‘automatically’ 
curbed, as explained by Ferson and Siegel (2001), so we do not have to impose 
leverage limits in constructing the rules. For example, the weights of the rule with 
expected (excess-return) equal to 10 bps per month never exceed one in absolute 
value whereas those of the rule with expected (excess-return) equal to 50 bps per 
month never exceed four in absolute value. In practice, this means that, by rationally 
exploiting currency predictability, it is possible to maintain a position that yields 50 
bps per month over the risk-free rate. The risk-free return would come from risk-free 
bonds posted as collateral (assuming that one has collateral to post, something that in 
the current ‘collateral crunch’ is not to be taken for granted!). Since the weight never 
exceeds four in absolute value, the collateral posted would remain within a 25 
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percent margin of the exposure, something that is deemed acceptable by many 
brokers, while the trading rule would provide the additional 50 bps per month. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, the rules have very rarely since 1997 experienced 
significant losses. The figure plots the t-statistics of the rolling 5-year alphas (with 
respect to the Fama and French 3-factor model) of the rules with expected (excess-
)return equal to 10 bps per month. The corresponding plot for the average rule with 
expected (excess-)return equal to 50 bps per month is almost indistinguishable and is 
not reported to save space. Similarly to the ‘baseline’ average rational rules, the 
series undergoes two clearly distinct ‘trends’, i.e. a descending one in 1997-2003 and 
an ascending one subsequently thereafter. The spike in the final part of the sample 
period, however, is more pronounced and the performance after 2003 is also 
generally better. On balance, this means that the optimal average rational rules are a 
rather attractive proposition for the fully rational trader who, thanks to his RE 
knowledge of unconditional moments, may be in a position to implement them.  
 
In Table 6, we report the estimated alphas and factor loadings (with respect to the 
Fama and French 3-factor model) of the optimal average rational rule based on the 
predictability of the currency futures in our dataset and expected (excess-)return 
equal to 10 bps per month. The noteworthy aspect is that, while the strategy does 
significantly outperform the AFX and carry trade, as implied by its positive and 
significant alpha, this is only down to the periods 1992-1995 and 2006-2010. In the 
period 1996-2000, instead, the alpha of the rational trading rule is even negative and 
in 2001-2005 it is positive but insignificant. Therefore, in the central part of the 
sample period, the AFX and carry trade, i.e. the predictability-based strategies 
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resembling those followed by market practitioners, indeed span the rational trading 
rules based on ML and optimal mean-variance optimizing portfolio formation. The 
‘anomaly’ is the alpha, i.e. un-spanned performance, of the rational trading rule at the 
beginning and at the end of the sample period, which points to inefficient currency 
pricing during these periods. 
 
5.  Currency market learning tests 
 
Both the technical and the rational rules exhibit positive and statistically significant 
alphas over extended portions of the sample period. This is especially the case of the 
levered and the ‘optimal’ rules. This implies that, at those times, the EMH was 
violated resulting in currency pricing not in line with RE, at least from the point of 
view of a representative investor who can take marginal positions in the strategies, 
and therefore does not need to be concerned about possibly high leverage, and/or is 
endowed with enough rationality to ‘know’ the unconditional SR of the strategies 
rules, so that she can implement the ‘optimal’ rational rules. In constructing the rules, 
we already controlled for transaction costs and, at the relatively low frequency of our 
study (monthly), the impact of microstructure effect that are typically felt at higher 
frequencies is likely limited, e.g. we can rule out price pressure effects on execution 
prices since the trader has plenty of time to execute them (a month!) without moving 
the market.  
 
A possible explanation that is left to explore is learning. More specifically, the 
positive performance of predictability-based strategies might reflect either 
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predictability induced by market learning, starting from possibly biased priors, or 
outright inefficient processing of news. The first possibility is consistent, in the 
language of Bossaerts (2004) and along the lines of Hansen (2007) and Hansen and 
Sargent (2007), with efficient market learning (EML) whereas the second is not. To 
test for violations of EML, we follow Bossaerts (2004) and construct ‘modified’ risk 
adjusted-rates of returns, i.e. 
 
1
~
+tr  ≡ 
1
1
~
~~
+
+ −
t
tt
p
pp
        (8) 
 
where 1 0...t t t tp p m m m−≡ɶ  is the ‘price’ of the strategy at time t deflated back to time t 
= 0, with t = 1, 2, …, T – 1, where 
sm  is the pricing kernel in t = s. The un-deflated 
‘price’ 
sp  is computed by capitalizing an initial one USD investment (made at time 
0) at the strategy rate of return, e.g. at the rate *
,i tr
 
for the rational trading rules for the 
i-th currency, until time t. For the purpose of testing for inefficient learning against 
the alternative represented by Bossaerts’ (2004) ELM, we interpret the strategy as a 
strip of “winning” securities, i.e. securities that offer payoffs Tωɶ  in T (capital 
accumulation at the end of the sample period) that exceed a given threshold TV , 
which is possibly different across ‘securities’ but large enough to entail an ‘alpha’ of 
the overall strategy as large as the one observed.  
 
Under ELM, the market prior beliefs about such payoffs may be biased, i.e. the 
market may initially underestimate the payoff unconditional probability, but market 
beliefs are updated efficiently as new information becomes available, i.e. the 
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posterior converges to the unconditional probability at the rate predicted by efficient 
Bayesian learning. The key result is that the modified returns in (8), as implied by 
Bossaerts’ (2004) Theorem 3 for the case of the general “winning” limited-liability 
security and under relatively mild technical assumptions6, are on average negative 
when a representative investor, who employs Bayesian updating, uses the correct 
likelihood in forming her beliefs about the predictive distribution of returns, 
 
 1( | ) 0t t T TE r Vω+ > ≤ɶ        (9) 
 
This inequality only requires that the Bayesian marginal investor uses the correct 
likelihood function of the data given final payoffs at time T, not necessarily the 
correct prior about the (deflated) payoff being above the given threshold TV . In 
specifying the kernel, which is needed to deflate the payoffs, we face the difficulty 
that we do not know it on a priori grounds. It is unclear how we could estimate the 
kernel if we were to adopt a parametric specification because (9) does not represent a 
traditional orthogonality condition, and therefore the standard empirical asset pricing 
estimation and testing machinery is ill-equipped to handle it. As a way around this 
difficulty, the deflation is conducted by specifying the pricing kernel as in the power-
CAPM, i.e. by setting  
 
                                                        
6
 The two assumptions are that (a) the conditional expectation of the payoff outside of the “default 
state” (i.e., the state that did not occur with the expected frequency in which the payoff comes in lower 
than VT) is correct and (b) the market until time T never knows for sure that the default state occurs. 
The first assumption is labelled by Bossaerts (2004) “Correct Conditional Expectation” (CCE), and 
essentially amounts to imposing efficient learning, and the second one is labelled No Early Exclusion 
Hypothesis (NEEH), which is highly reasonable in our context.  
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Here, 
,f tr  is the conditionally risk-free rate of interest, , 1m tr +  is the market excess-
return and RRA is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the marginal investor, 
which we set equal, following Potì and Wang (2010), to either 2.5 or 5.0, i.e. RRAV = 
2.5 and RRAV = 5. As argued by these authors, the first choice is consistent with the 
classic two-moment CAPM whereas the second choice is consistent with 3 and 
higher moment extensions of this model, along the lines of Kraus and Litzenberger’s 
(1976) 3M-CAPM and Dittmar’s (2002) 4M-CAPM, as well as with the Fama and 
French 3-Factor model and other specifications, such as habit formation models and 
conditional models, that generate relatively large economy-wide maximal SRs. The 
average modified risk-adjusted returns for a number of technical and rational trading 
rules based on such deflation are reported in Table 7, together with t-statistics 
constructed using OLS standard errors, for both the full sample periods for which 
each strategy can be constructed and for the shorter sample period, from 1997 to 
2010, for which data is available for all strategies. Under the EML null and the 
inefficient market learning alternative, the reported t-statistics should be non-
positive. Equivalently, under the inefficient market learning null, the t-statistics are 
positive. As shown in the Table, we can reject the latter null in one-sided tests at 
conventional levels for most rules.  The exceptions are the leveraged rational trading 
rules and the optimal rational rules under RRAV = 2.5 in the shorter sample period, 
i.e. in 1997-2010. For such rules, we cannot reject inefficient learning though the 
statistics are not positive enough for us to reject ELM. On balance, these results 
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overwhelmingly support the view that currency markets are indeed efficient in 
processing information as it becomes available, in spite of (unspecified) biases in 
prior beliefs implied by the EMH violations, i.e. by the ‘alphas’ of the rational and 
technical trading rules.  
 
6.  Currency trading and market learning 
 
To appreciate how currency market efficiency evolves over time, in Panel A and B of 
Figure 4, we plot the OLS t-statistics of the rolling alphas of the currency futures 
average ‘baseline’ and ‘optimal’ rational rules with expected (excess-)return of 50 
bps per month, as well as those of the momentum and carry trade technical rules. The 
baseline rule is constructed under no-leverage restriction. They are similar in terms of 
both their order of magnitude and pattern of variation over time, but the ‘optimal’ 
one tracks the carry trade more closely when the latter performs best. There is also in 
both cases a striking overlap between the rational trading rule and the AFX index, 
except during 2003-2007. The overlap is all the more remarkable when one considers 
that the two strategies are based on a completely different construction methodology, 
though they seek to capture the same source of predictability.  
 
The AFX is a value-weighted index of simple moving average strategies, consisting 
of buying or selling one unit of a given set of currencies based on signals generated 
by the cross-over of the exchange rate with its moving averages of pre-specified 
length, with weights that reflect the importance of each currency pair in world 
currency trading. Therefore, it can be interpreted as the momentum rule followed by 
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the ‘representative’ currency manager. The rational trading rules, instead, are based 
on the weights described in (2), which in principle can take any real value and reflect 
a directional signal and volatility filter generated by a predictive model, i.e. the 
ARMA(p,q) augmented by the GARCH(1,1), selected and estimated using ML, in an 
effort to mimic RE. Moreover, the AFX index only takes positions in the main 
currencies, i.e. DM/EUR, GBP, JPY and CHF, against the USD and each other, 
whereas the average rational trading rule is based on a broader set of currencies that 
include emerging ones. Nonetheless, the ‘baseline’ rational trading rule ‘beats’ the 
AFX Currency Management index only during 2003-2007. During this time, 
however, the rational rule is, in turn, beaten by the carry trade strategy, i.e. the 
HMLFX in the figure. True,  as shown in Table 6 and also in Panel B of the Figure, 
the ‘optimal’ rational rule beats the AFX over much of the post-2003 period but, as 
already noted, implementing this strategy requires ex-ante knowledge of its 
unconditional SR. This might be too stringent a requirement in practice. Imperfectly 
rational currency portfolio managers may well hold initially wrong priors and learn 
the true unconditional SR of the rule only slowly. Therefore, if we postulate even 
mild limits to investors’ rationality, and hence leave out rules that are ‘too’ rational, 
we see that during our sample period there is always a strategy, out of those followed 
by market practitioners and replicated in stylized manner by our technical trading 
rules, that either closely matches or beats the rational ones. This suggests that the 
technical trading rules have been used, at different points in time, as heuristics by 
which a  possibly imperfectly rational market practitioner have achieved an 
essentially rational outcome, while likely economizing on scarce resources such as 
managerial attention.  
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A crucial question is then whether market practitioners are able to decide when it is 
the right time to switch technical trading strategy. There is no data on  the ‘relative 
usage’ of different technical rules over time but we can gauge their popularity by 
measuring how frequently words associated to such strategies appear in the press. In 
Panel A and B of Figure 5 we plot the usage over time of the phrases “carry trade” as 
well as “filter rule” and filter rules”, respectively, in the book database searched by 
Google Ngram Viewer7. The database includes more than 500 billion words (361 
billion for the English language) from 5,195,769 digitized books, or about 4 percent 
of all books ever published. Rather remarkably, the usage of the words “carry trade” 
picks up in 2003, right when the usage of the words “filter rule” and/or “filter rules”, 
by which professional currency managers commonly refer to momentum technical 
rules of the type considered in this paper, declines. The books containing such words 
are most likely professional publications or at least they are geared towards a public 
of practitioners, since the privileged outlets for academic articles by financial 
economists operating in English-speaking countries tend to be peer-reviewed 
scientific journals. These trends, therefore, suggest that the world of currency 
managers, or at least the publishers catering for their reading needs, turned its 
attention away from filter rules and towards the carry trade precisely at the time when 
the former were starting to under-perform both the latter and the rational trading 
rules. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the Google Ngram database only includes 
words appeared in books published until the end of 2008 and therefore it is not 
                                                        
7
 The link to the tool, with the search set on the words “filter rule” and “filter rules”, is: 
http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=filter+rule%2C+filter+rules&year_start=1997&year_
end=2008&corpus=0&smoothing=3 
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possible to establish whether the relative trend in the word usage reversed when the 
carry trade turned unprofitable relative to the filter/momentum rules after 2008.  
 
7. Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 
In this paper, we assess the statistical and economic significance of predictability in 
currency returns over the period 1971-2010. We find that predictability at times 
violates RE restrictions, implying that currencies are mispriced relative to the RE 
benchmark and violation of the EMH. Currency mispricing and currency market 
inefficiency are not constant over time but their evolution does not fully conform to 
the popular view that currency markets are becoming increasingly efficient over time. 
While it is true that currency excess-predictability, and thus mispricing decreases in 
the 90s, it does pick up again in recent times. This is especially the case of currencies 
of emerging market economies, but not exclusively. In fact, the Euro, which is 
relatively new as a currency but is in use in a highly developed economic area, 
experienced the most dramatic surge in excess-predictability. We find, however, that 
popular currency trading strategies represent simple and effective ways to capture the 
bulk of such excess-predictability and that, in spite of the latter and the degree of 
currency mispricing that it implies, currency market learning unfolds efficiently, that 
is markets process new information efficiently as it becomes available though they 
may misprice currencies due to initially wrong priors.  
 
On the one hand, our results pose a stronger empirical challenge to established 
models of rational exchange rate determination than previous ones in that they imply 
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that it might be premature to brush off excess-predictability as a temporary 
phenomenon, largely disappearing or due to disappear shortly as soon as currency 
markets will have completed their journey towards full efficiency. On the other hand, 
and more importantly, our results suggest that technical trading rules are largely a 
rational attempt by market participants to exploit predictability. That is, both the filter 
strategies tracked by the AFX index and, subsequently, the carry trade have acted, at 
different points in time, as ways in which speculators have attempted to exploit 
currency market inefficiencies. This, in turn, helps answer the important question of 
whether such strategies create or prick “bubbles” inherent in the episodes of 
inefficient pricing. The evidence appears to suggest the latter, although more 
investigation is required before a firmer conclusion can be reached.  
 
It also remains to be established why they do not do so in a more direct way. In fact, 
technical trading can be seen as a means to exploit excess-predictability without 
having to first detect it. Therefore, if market participants were able to directly detect 
mispricing through the currency market counterpart of ‘fundamental analysis’, 
presumably they would not need to resort to technical trading. The question then is 
what prevents currency market participants from identifying and exploiting currency 
mispricing in a more direct way. Possible explanations might lie in both the rational 
asset pricing domain, e.g. costs required to undertake the analysis and other frictions, 
or in the behavioural domain, e.g.  limits to rationality, or possibly somewhere in 
between, for example the need to economize on scarce managerial attention as in the 
model formulated by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010). Either way, a fruitful 
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direction for future research is to explore the role of technical trading rules as 
heuristics deployed by market participants to supplement their pricing abilities. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of predictability-based strategies returns 
 
   Obs Mean St. dev. SR SR ann. Skew. Kurtosi
s 
    
  
    
 Panel A 
(Rational trading rules) 
AD1   212 0.54 8.34 0.06 0.22 -0.15 
(0.648) 
4.60 
(0.000) 
BP1   212 -0.14 3.52 -0.04 -0.14 1.00 
(0.003) 
4.75 
(0.000) 
CD1   212 0.02 6.80 0.00 0.01 1.22 
(0.000) 
8.44 
(0.000) 
JY1   212 0.07 5.31 0.01 0.04 -1.28 
(0.000) 
5.91 
(0.000) 
SF1   212 0.17 5.01 0.03 0.12 -1.44 
(0.000) 
9.25 
(0.000) 
EC1   85 1.60 17.37 0.09 0.32 2.02 
(0.000) 
11.13 
(0.000) 
NV1   97 0.43 8.07 0.05 0.18 -1.84 
(0.000) 
9.19 
(0.000) 
BR1   115 0.89 8.66 0.10 0.36 1.59 
(0.000) 
8.47 
(0.000) 
PE1   122 6.49 37.00 0.18 0.61 2.88 
(0.000) 
11.74 
(0.000) 
RA1   97 1.70 23.99 0.07 0.25 2.52 
(0.000) 
10.60 
(0.000) 
RU1   86 0.36 1.67 0.22 0.75 4.55 
(0.000) 
23.25 
(0.000) 
TU1   180 -0.02 6.83 0.00 -0.01 -0.17 
(0.000) 
3.74 
(0.000) 
All (average)   212 1.01 13.14 0.08 0.27 2.70 
(0.000) 
14.50 
(0.000) 
          
 Panel B 
(Other predictability-based strategies and risk factors) 
AFX   212 0.18 1.76 0.10 0.36 2.035 
(0.000) 
6.83 
(0.000) 
HMLFX All   212 0.43 2.53 0.17 0.59 -0.91 
(0.001) 
0.54 
(0.446) 
HMLFX 
Developed 
  212 0.19 3.08 0.06 0.22 -0.66 
(0.0522) 
1.09 
(0.123) 
Rm - Rf   212 0.45 4.54 0.10 0.34 -0.84 
(0.013) 
1.599 
(0.024) 
SMB   212 0.26 3.60 0.07 0.25 0.42 
(0.218) 
-0.27 
(0.700) 
HML   212 0.37 3.49 0.10 0.36 -0.50 
(0.142) 
1.78 
(0.012) 
    
  
    
 
 
 
 
Notes. This table reports descriptive statistics for returns on maximal SR-rational trading rules for each 
currency and their average, in Panel A, and for other predictability-based strategies, i.e. the momentum 
strategy tracked by the AFX Currency Management index and the carry trade strategy tracked by the HML 
Index of Lustig et al. (2011), as well as the Fama and French factors. The descriptive statistics are the 
number of monthly observations, the percentage mean, standard deviation, SR (monthly and annualized), 
skewness and kurtosis (together with their p-values under the null of no departure from normality).  
32 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Out-Of-Sample Performance vs. Fama & French 3-Factor model of Rational Trading Rules 
1997-2010 
 
 AD1 CD1 JY1 BP1 SF1 EUR NV1 BR1 PE1 RA1 RU1 TU1 
             
ARIMA+GARCH             
SR 22.42 0.82 4.34 -13.54 11.77 32.00 18.49 35.70 60.73 24.60 74.54 -1.22 
α 0.96 -0.09 -0.01 0.16 -0.05 4.21 1.31 1.76 6.01 5.26 0.57 0.02 
t-statistics 1.35* -0.15 -0.03 0.51 -0.11 1.80** 1.28* 1.74** 1.44* 1.74** 2.54** 0.04 
p-value (0.089) (0.439) (0.490) (0.305) (0.458) (0.037) (0.100) (0.041) (0.076) (0.041) (0.006) (0.485) 
 
            
ETS 
            
SR 14.91 -11.37 3.51 19.36 -8.50 -11.94 3.31 23.73 42.34 -3.03 27.63 11.30 
α 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 
t-statistics 1.51* -0.16 -0.10 2.17** -0.47 0.70 0.86 1.23* 2.04** 0.72 1.43* 0.12 
p-value (0.066) (0.437) (0.461) (0.015) (0.320) (0.241) (0.195) (0.111) (0.021) (0.236) (0.078) (0.452) 
   
 
         
 
Notes. This table reports, in the top panel, percentage alphas and annualized Sharpe Ratios of predictability-based maximal-SR strategies, as well as the t-statistics of the alphas and 
the corresponding p-values (in brackets). The hypothesized level of transaction costs is two basis points (i.e. 0.02 percent) per each way transaction and the predictive models are 
ARMA(p,q) with p and q selected by the AIC estimated over rolling 5-year windows over the sample period 1992-2010. The data frequency of the underlying currency futures return 
series is monthly. One and two asterisks draw attention to positive alpha significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
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Out of Sample Performance of predictability-based strategies vs. Fama and French 
3-Factor Model 
 
 alpha 
(perc.) 
OLS s.e. 
(perc.) 
OLS t-stat. HAC s.e. 
(perc.) 
HAC t-stat. 
      
1992-2010      
Technical trading rules      
HMLFX (developd) -0.02 0.20 -0.09 0.22 -0.08 
HMLFX (all) 0.33 0.17 *1.94 0.17 *1.89 
AFX 0.20 0.12 *1.65 0.09 *2.29 
Rational trading rules 
   
  
r*avg (all, lev. = unrestricted) 8.61 6.86 1.26 7.34 1.17 
r*avg (all, lev. = 0) 0.10 0.06 *1.65 0.06 *1.71 
r*avg (emer., lev. = unrestricted) 5.65 2.25 *2.51 3.37 *1.68 
r*avg (emer., lev. = 0) 0.08 0.06 1.34 0.06 1.42 
Rational trading rules – 
Lustig et al. (2011) portfolios  
     
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 10) 6.76 3.29 *2.05 3.18 *2.12 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 4) 2.76 1.43 *1.93 1.40 *1.97 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 0) 0.81 0.45 *1.78 0.42 *1.93 
      
1997-2010      
Technical trading rules      
HMLFX (developd) 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.10 
HMLFX (all) 0.44 0.19 *2.32 0.18 *2.46 
AFX 0.21 0.14 1.48 0.09 *2.32 
Rational trading rules 
   
  
r*avg (all, lev. = unrestricted) 9.93 8.90 1.12 8.46 1.17 
r*avg (all, lev. = 0) 0.11 0.08 1.45 0.06 *1.70 
r*avg (emer., lev. = unrestricted) 5.85 2.48 *2.36 3.44 *1.70 
r*avg (emer., lev. = 0) 0.09 0.07 1.32 0.06 1.48 
Rational trading rules – 
Lustig et al. (2011) portfolios  
     
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 10) 7.91 4.04 *1.96 3.73 *2.12 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 4) 3.17 1.74 *1.82 1.61 *1.97 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 0) 0.76 0.53 1.44 0.41 *1.87 
      
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table reports alphas and t-tests, using either OLS or HAC Newy-West (1987) standard errors, for 
returns on average rational trading rules for groups of currencies (‘all’ indicates that all currencies are 
included in the strategy whereas ‘developed’ or ‘emerging’ indicate otherwise in the obvious way) and levels 
of leverage (denoted as ‘lev’), based on ARMA(p,q) models of excess-returns selected by the small sample 
AIC and augmented by a GARCH(1,1,) specification for the conditional variance, as well as other 
predictability-based strategies, i.e. the momentum strategy tracked by the AFX Currency Management index 
and the carry trade strategy tracked by the HML Index of Lustig et al. (2011), with respect to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. The descriptive statistics are the number of monthly observations, the percentage 
alpha, OLS and HAC percentage standard errors and their associated t-statistics. All variables are denoted as 
in the text. 
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Table 4 
Out-Of-Sample Performance of Predictability-Based Strategies vs. CAPM 
 
 AFX Carry All  Carry 
Devel. 
r* All  r* Emerged r* 
Emerged 
except 
EUR 
r* 
Emerging 
r* 
Emerging 
except 
NV1 
         
1992-1995         
α 0.22 -0.12 -0.22   0.03   
t-stat. 0.99 -0.27 -0.42   *1.74   
p-value (0.320) (0.785) (0.673)   (0.081)   
         
1996-2000         
α 0.35 0.44 0.13 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
t-stat. **2.30 1.16 0.40 -0.23 0.06 0.06 -0.73 -0.73 
p-value (0.021) (0.245) (0.688) (0.815) (0.948) (0.948) (0.462) (0.462) 
         
2001-2005         
α 0.00 0.90 0.69 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 
t-stat. 0.18 **4.60 **3.49 -0.13 -0.21 0.34 **2.04 **2.05 
p-value (0.853) (0.000) (0.000) (0.892) (0.829) (0.728) (0.041) (0.039) 
     
    
2006-2010         
α 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.33 0.27 0.00 0.61 0.62 
t-stat. 1.16 0.39 0.26 **2.19 **2.08 0.30 **2.31 **2.38 
p-value (0.245) (0.695) (0.789) (0.028) (0.037) (0.75) (0.020) (0.016) 
     
    
 
  Notes. This table reports the percentage alphas of the AFX strategy, the carry trade strategies (i.e., the carry trade HML Index 
of Lustig et al. (2011) for developed countries and for the full sample of countries) and the rational trading rules (ARMA + 
GARCH) for all currencies in our sample, together with their t-statistics based on OLS standard errors. One and two asterisks 
draw attention to positive alpha significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. The performance attribution model is the 
CAPM. 
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Table 5 
Out-Of-Sample Performance of Predictability-Based Strategies vs. Fama & French 
3-Factor Model 
 
 AFX Carry All  Carry 
Emerged 
r* All  r* Emerged r* 
Emerged 
except 
EUR 
r* 
Emerging 
r* 
Emerging 
except 
NV1 
         
1992-1995         
α 0.28 -0.06 -0.05  0.033    
t-stat. 1.10 -0.14 -0.15  *1.81    
p-value (0.267) (0.884) (0.873)  (0.069)    
         
1996-2000         
α 0.28 0.45 0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
t-stat. 1.94 (1.27) 0.15 -0.10 0.06 0.06 -0.50 -0.50 
p-value (0.051) (0.201) (0.877) 0.92 (0.945) (0.948) (0.610) (0.610) 
         
2001-2005         
α -0.14 0.78 0.54 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.07 
t-stat. 
-0.78 **4.31 **2.46 -0.38 -0.43 -1.06 1.55 1.51 
p-value (0.432) (0.000) (0.013) (0.702) (0.660) (0.286) (0.119) (0.130) 
         
2006-2010         
α 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.58 0.59 
t-stat. 1.36 0.62 0.54 **2.52 **2.39 0.28 **2.39 **2.47 
p-value (0.220) (0.533) (0.587) (0.011) (0.016) (0.778) (0.016) (0.013) 
 
 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table reports the percentage alphas of the AFX strategy, the carry trade strategies (i.e., the carry trade HML Index 
of Lustig et al. (2011) for developed countries and for the full sample of countries) and the rational trading rules (ARMA + 
GARCH) for all currencies in our sample, together with their t-statistics based on OLS standard errors. One and two asterisks 
draw attention to positive alpha significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. The performance attribution model is the 
Fama & French 3-Factor Model. 
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Figure 1 
Time-Varying CAPM Alpha t-Statistic of the Equally-Weighted Average Rational 
Trading Rule 
 
Panel A 
 (All) 
 
Panel B 
 (Emerged currencies) 
 
 
Panel C 
(Emerging currencies) 
 
 
  Notes. The panels of this figure plot the time-varying t-statistic of the 
CAPM alpha, estimated over rolling 5-year windows, of average 
equally-weighted rational trading rules. The currency futures that 
enter the rules are subsets of the following: AD1, BP1, BR1, CD1, 
EC1, JY1, NV1, PE1, RA1, RU1, SF1 and TU1.  
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Figure 2 
The Case of the Euro 
 
 
Panel A 
(Emerged currencies except EUR) 
 
 
 
Panel B 
(EUR only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. Panel A of this figure plots the time-varying t-statistic of the 
CAPM alpha, estimated over rolling 5-year windows, of the equally-
weighted rational trading rule comprising positions in AD1, BP1, 
CD1, JY1, SF1. Panel B plots the time-varying alpha for the strategy 
based on EC1.  
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Figure 3 
Time-Varying Fama and French 3-Factor Model Alpha of the Average ‘Optimal’ 
Rational Trading Rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This figure plots the time-varying OLS t-statistics of the alphas, with respect to the Fama 
& French 3-factor model estimated over rolling 5-year windows, of the average strategy based 
on the ‘optimal’ rational trading rules with Ferson and Siegel (2001) weights that exploit the out-
of-sample predictability of AD1, BP1, BR1, CD1, EC1, JY1, NV1, PE1, RA1, RU1, SF1 and 
TU1, and an interpolating 6th order polynomial.  
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Table 6 
Factor-Pricing and Spanning of Average Optimal Rational Trading Rule 
 
Sample period α Rm-Rf SMB HML AFX HMLFX 
       
1992-2010 0.07 -1.76 0.71 0.43   
 **(2.06) (-1.21) (0.94) (-0.60)   
1992-1995 0.03 -0.61 0.34 -0.55   
 **(2.52) (-1.16) (0.98) (-1.59)   
1996-2000 0.00 -0.43 -0.37 -0.46   
 (0.03) (-1.21) (-1.29) (-0.86)   
2001-2005 0.04 2.10 1.35 1.52   
 (1.50) **(2.34) (1.00) (1.40)   
2006-2010 0.17 -7.39 1.98 6.08   
 *(1.84) **(-3.94) (0.37) *(1.90)   
       
1992-2010 0.06 -0.74 0.81 -0.32 9.99 3.35 
 **(2.32) (-0.89) (1.02) (0.54) **(2.98) **(2.20) 
1992-1995 0.02 -0.11 0.41 -0.32 2.08 0.41 
 **(3.02) (-0.24) (1.20) (-1.22) **(3.41) (1.54) 
1996-2000 
-0.01 -0.66 -0.49 -0.84 3.07 -0.74 
 (-0.40) (-1.53) *(-1.69) (-1.35) **(7.31) *(-1.66) 
2001-2005 0.04 1.69 -0.10 -0.15 9.47 0.14 
 (1.59) **(3.01) (-0.12) (-0.13) **(3.93) (0.09) 
2006-2010 0.14 -2.24 6.05 2.88 21.10 -7.45 
 **(3.42) *(-1.86) (1.63) (1.59) **(6.29) **(-2.55) 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table, in the first column after the column indicating the sample period, reports 
the percentage alphas of the average rational trading rule based on the predictability of the 
interest rate-sorted currency portfolios provided by Lustig et al (2008). The following four 
columns report the percentage factor loadings and, in brackets, the associated t-statistic 
based on Newy and West (1987) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors. One and two asterisks draw attention to positive alpha significant at the 5 and 2.5 
percent level (in a one-sided test), respectively. 
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Table 7 
Bossaerts’ (2004) ELM Tests 
 
 
 Perc.  mean  
(RRA = 2.5) 
t-stat. 
(RRA = 2.5) 
Perc.  mean  
(RRA = 5.0) 
t-stat. 
(RRA = 5.0) 
      
1997-2010      
Technical trading rules      
RX (developed) 
 -1.73 *-1.86 -4.98 **-2.66 
HMLFX (developd)  -1.56 *-1.70 -4.77 **-2.57 
RX (all) 
 -1.71 *-1.85 -4.96 **-2.66 
HMLFX (all)  -1.26 -1.39 -4.47 **-2.42 
AFX 
 -1.66 *-1.69 -4.99 **-2.60 
Rational trading rules 
 
  
  
r*avg (all, lev. = unrestricted)  12.86 0.27 6.22 0.12 
r*avg (all, lev. = 0)  -1.69 *-1.75 -5.02 **-2.63 
r*avg (all., optimal)  -1.47 -1.50 -4.81 **-2.51 
r*avg (emer., lev. = unrestricted)  -0.44 -0.31 -3.74 *-1.77 
r*avg (emer., lev. = 0)  -1.69 *-1.77 -5.01 **-2.64 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 10)  -3.62 -0.40 -7.34 -0.83 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 4)  -4.63 -1.46 -7.95 **-2.08 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 0)  -1.33 -1.25 -4.58 **-2.36 
      
1992-2010  
  
  
Technical trading rules    
RX (developed) 
 -2.15 **-2.87 -5.59 **-3.73 
HMLFX (developd)  -2.00 **-2.70 -5.41 **-3.63 
RX (all) 
 -2.13 **-2.87 -5.58 **-3.73 
HMLFX (all)  -1.74 **-2.39 -5.14 **-3.49 
AFX 
 -2.07 **-2.64 -5.58 **-3.64 
Rational trading rules 
 
  
  
r*avg (all, lev. = unrestricted)  9.16 0.25 3.16 0.08 
r*avg (all, lev. = 0)  -2.08 **-2.69 -5.54 **-3.63 
r*avg (all., optimal)  -1.95 **-2.48 -5.45 **-3.57 
r*avg (emer., lev. = unrestricted)  -0.74 -0.57 -4.21 **-2.17 
r*avg (emer., lev. = 0)  -1.96 **-2.22 -5.45 **-3.11 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 10)  -1.24 -0.17 -5.07 -0.69 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 4)  -4.53 *-1.78 -8.06 **-2.64 
r*avg, carry (all, lev. = 0)  -1.65 *-1.91 -5.08 **-3.27 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table reports means and t-tests for the one-sided null that the means non-negative. All 
variables are denoted as in the text. One and two asterisks draw attention to when the null is rejected at 
the 5 and 2.5 percent level of significance (in a one-sided test), respectively. 
 41
Figure 4 
Time-Varying Fama and French 3-Factor Model Alpha of Predictability-Based 
Strategies 
 
Panel A 
(No-Leverage Average ‘Baseline’ Rational Trading Rule vs. Momentum and Carry) 
 
 
Panel B 
(Average ‘Optimal’ Rational Trading Rule vs. Momentum and Carry) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Panel A and B of this figure plots the time-varying OLS t-statistics of the alphas relative 
to the Fama & French 3-factor model, estimated over rolling 5-year windows, of the average 
baseline and optimal, respectively, rational trading rules that exploit the out-of-sample 
predictability of AD1, BP1, BR1, CD1, EC1, JY1, NV1, PE1, RA1, RU1, SF1 and TU1, and an 
interpolating 6th order polynomial, as well as the time-varying t-statistics of the alphas of the the 
momentum strategy (i.e. the strategy tracked by the AFX index) and of the carry trade strategy 
(i.e., the carry trade HML Index of Lustig et al. (2011)). 
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Figure 5 
Usage of Technical Trading Rules-Related Words  
(Google Books Ngram Viewer)  
 
Panel A 
(Usage of words “carry trade”) 
 
 
Panel B 
(Usage of words “filter rule, filter rules”) 
 
 
Panel C 
(Usage of words “carry trade” vs “filter rule”) 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Panel A and B of this figure plot the usage of the phrases 
“carry trade” as well as “filter rule” and filter rules”, respectively, in 
the book database searched by Google Ngram Viewer. The database 
includes more than 500 billion words (361 billion for the English 
language) from 5,195,769 digitized books, or about 4 percent of all 
books ever published. Panel C offers a more direct comparison. The 
vertical axis reports the usage of the indicated words as a percentage 
of the total number of English words in the database.  
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